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PLATO'S UNWRITTEN DIALECTIC OF THE ONE AND THE GREAT AND SMALL

In the present paper I wish to deal with certain main points in the
Unwritten Doctrines of Plato, which are detailed in the reports of Aristotle
on these teachings, which reports must have been based on Aristotle's own
memories and notes of what Plato actually said in the seminars or
which he and many others attended, and which are further elucidated by the
many ancient commentators on the writings of Aristotle, such as Alexander,
Simplicius, Philoponus, and Syrianus, as well as by a most valuable anti-Platonic
polemic of Sextus Empiricus in the Tenth Book of his treatise Against the
Mathematicians. Aristotle, the Aristotelian commentators and Sextus Empiricus
put it beyond all doubt that Plato had an important body of Unwritten Doctrines
which were only inadequately adumbrated in the Dialogues, but which can none the
less be advantageously used to illuminate very many passages in the Dialogues,
and particularly some in the Republic, the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the
Phi Tenus. In my book Plato:

The Written Unwritten Doctrines and in my shorter

book Plato and Platonism, I have tried to use the material touching the Unwritten
Doctrines to illuminate the written Dialogues, and in the former work I have
also provided a translation of much of this material, which brings together
much of this material, which is otherwise widely scattered.

I do not consider

that anyone can rightly interpret Plato's written work who neglects to consider
the light thrown on it by the reports of the Unwritten Doctrines.

These reports

are in many ways enigmatic, and have had, moreover, a very indirect, equivocal
influence on subsequent philosophy.

The Neoplatonists made comparatively little

use of them, though their stress on the One as the Supreme Hypostasis in their
Absolute, and their identification of it with the Socratic-Platonic Good, plainly
derives from this source.

The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, including Aquinas,

were content to repeat Aristotle's reports and censures with little attempt
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either to understand or evaluate them, while the Nineteenth Century followed
Schleiermacher in basing all accounts of Platonic doctrine on the written Dia
logues, coming to the conclusion, since the reports of the Agrapha Dogmata did
not square with the written Dialogues, that these Doctrines were the pitiable
products of some decline of Plato's genius into final senility, which had best
be passed unnoticed.

Eduard Zeller, the authoritative late Nineteenth Century

historian of philosophy, took this view, and in this country the qreat scholar
ship of Harold F. Cherniss attempted, in important books written in 1944 and
1945, to save the reputation of Plato by holding that the so-called Unwritten
Doctrines were really all a colossal misunderstanding and misinterpretation of
Aristotle, who certainly had a genius for misuderstanding the views of other
philosophers, and that Plato in fact had no Unwritten Doctrines of any importance,
and that he could be, and should be, completely studied in the Dialogues alone.
This opinion had prevailed in strength throughout the long night of analytic
philosophy in this country and in Europe, and has only been broken in quite
recent times by the works of Gaiser and Kramer in Germany, and of myself in the
Anglo-Saxon world.

Particular scandal attaches to the fact that Plato in his

Unwritten Doctrines is said to have identified his Eide with Numbers, an identic
fication in itself absurd, and then not even with ordinary Natural Numbers, but
with Numbers of a special eidetic sort which involved no addition of unit to
unit, and which were begotten by the transcendental intercourse of two generative,
Pythagorean Principles, Unity itself, an intrinsically equalizing good Principle,
which imposed limit or definiteness on a second Principle, which was always
indulging in a bad, blind process of indefinite increase and diminution, limit
less and bad.

Modern analytic philosophers cannot generate Numbers out of an

intercourse between absolute Unity and endlessly burgeoning multiplicity, and
must hesitate to attribute such mystical nonsense to the Plato whom they at
least want to admire.

Our suggestion, however, is that Plato's arithmetization
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of the Eide was a sublime, is unsystematic anticipation of the whole of modern
scientific rationalism, with its stress on unifying patterns and measures, and
that, in his retention of the countering presence of the Great and Small in all
things, he also recognized the pervasive presence of an element of inexactitude
and continuity in all things without which the limiting work of the reasonable
element in things would be null and void.

And, by his introduction of two such

antithetical Principles, Plato may be held to have made a most interesting
contribution to Value-theory, in that the Good is seen by him as essentially
active and causative, and as engaged in an endless task of subordinating the
intrinsically indefinite and chaotically multiple to predictable order and sim
plicity.

The Principle of Unity and Limit is first at work on the timeless plane

of the Eide, and gives rise to the endless array of Natural Numbers, of geometrical
Points, Lines, Surfaces and Solids, and then of Motions which involve an abstractly
idealized Space and Time, and which point on to Principles of Self-motion or
Soul, whose type of orderliness can further generate the many-souled orderliness
of Society.

How this whole immense generation of differentiated multiplicity

out of partless Unity was to have proceeded was never, arguably, for Plato, a
completely conceived concept, but rather a grandiose project, something that
the true philosopher would have to elaborate if he were ever to put an end to
human confusion and wickedness.

He did not believe that he himself possessed

the generative dialectic in question, or that his writings and discourses were
more than an adumbration of it.

The reported Unwritten Doctrines of Plato are

hard to understand because they were not only unwritten, but not fully formulable
in the argumentative discourse of the time.

They represented an ideal towards

which the thinker had to work, and of which all theoretical, practical and
aesthetic endeavors compassed only the beginnings.

They were not for Plato a

finished body of doctrine to which he possessed a perfect key, and it is for
this reason that the traditions regarding Plato's Unwritten Doctrine are so hard
to expand and to expound convincingly.
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Plato's progression towards the Unwritten Doctrines may be held to have
taken place in two steps, which may be called, respectively, the Socratic and
the Pythagorean illumination.

The Socratic illumination represents the turning

of the dialectic of Socrates into an ontology.

Socrates was concerned to arrive

at Logoi or analytic accounts of the generic natures or meanings common to a
wide range of specific and individual cases, and particularly to the generic
natures or meanings peculiar to cases of the moral life: the Just, the Wise,
the Temperate, the Courageous and their opposites.

It was possible for these

natures or meanings to be present unanalysed in a man's character or conduct or
moral opinions, but a man could only have knowledge of them if he could frame
definitory accounts of the meanings in question, saying exactly what they covered
or excluded, in al 1 their applications, and omitting what only applied in some
of their applications.

It also involved arranging these generic meanings in a

comprehensive pattern, which set forth all their communities and specific dif
ferences in relation to one another.

Socrates recognized the presence of generic

meanings in other regions than the moral:

he had Pythagorean followers who led

him to see them in mathematical fields, and he was not uninterested in the
speculative conceptions of the physicists.

But it was axiological and moral

conceptions to which his dialectic was principally devoted, since he did not
believe that one could really live well unless one had clear and certain know
ledge, not merely fluctuating opinion, of what Goodness in all its species
really was.

Plato applying his genius to the Socratic dialectic turned it into

an ontology:

generic meanings, whether in moral discourse or elsewhere, were

not only real presences in the world through their many species and instances,
and known and enjoyed iji these, but had a more absolute being than those species
and instances, and in fact conferred on the latter all the real being that they
possessed.

They were, moreover, not merely apprehended through their species

and instances, which were often only poor illustrations of them, but rather gave
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their species and instances all the intelligibility of which they were capable.
To generic natures or meanings Plato gave the new name of Eide or Ideas, and
they were held to be neither general names on men's tongues, nor general
thoughts in men's minds, but the only entities that could without qualification
be said to be, and which were further, in some sense, supremely causative, since
their instances only were what they were by exemplifying them, while they were
what they were without regard to an exemplifications or instances.

While

essentially able to have instances, they did not need to have any, and in fact
never had instances that perfectly exemplified or embodied them.

Of Eide as so

depicted Plato held that they were separated by an ontological gulf from all
their instances, since they were general meanings themselves rather than specific
cases of these:

the Just Itself is the pure essence of Justice, not a specific,

probably imperfect case of Justice.

Some modern interpreters have criticized

Platonism for, as they hold predicating the Eide of the Eide, regarding them as
perfect instances of themselves, and so merely adding a world of perfect
exemplars to our world of imperfect ones, which fail to explain anything in our
imperfect world.

Aristotle's criticism of Platonism in the Metaphysics and

elsewhere made similar objections.

But Plato, arguably, never saw the Eide as

exemplary instances, but as something better than the most exemplary exemplar,
being the pure essences which, while communicating themselves to their instances
in varying degrees, were a radically different sort of thing from them.

And the

immense gulf between Eide and instances did not mean that Eide were cut off
from the cases which 'shared' in them or were 'modelled' upon them, but merely
that they had a different role, and belonged to a different ontological type,
being what can be shared in or approached by the character of its instances,
without itself being an instance of any sort at all.

The very terms 'particip

ation' and 'imitation' were arguably meant by Plato to indicate a very real and
essential relation which demands, and does not violate, a gulf of type.

General
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meanings make a radically different contribution to the world - we may say meta
phorically - but this does not exclude, but rather requires, that instances
should be instances of Eide, and that Eide should at least be capable of
instantiation.
There are many further respects in which Eide had to differ ontologically
from their instances:

they had all to be essentially non-sensuous, however much

present in, and required by their sensuous instances.

The qualities of the

senses varied from occasion to occasion and from person to person, but had to
have a foundation in pure proportions and numbers which only the pure mind
could compass non-sensuously.

The Eide, further, are essentially unchangeable,

and out of time altogether, whereas their instances are part of the perpetual
flux of instantial being, and are constantly coming into being and passing away,
or being replaced by the instantiation of some other Eidos.

Instances, further

can instantiate conflicting Eide, e.g. unity and multiplicity, in a manner
impossible at the eidetic level, and instances can be composed out of partial
instances, and be dissolved into the latter, in a manner in which Eide, while
permitting differences of aspect and relation, can never be compounded out of,
nor dissolved into, component Eide, but retain in all relations an essential
incomposite unity.

Instances, further can be many and diverse and widely

scattered, while the Eide which they instantiate remain wholly single and self
identical , and indivisible into scattered parts.

Location in space involves

distinctions of instantiation, but not of the Eide which are instantiated.
Eide, further, without loss of identity, must be held to be capable of forms
of mutual pervasion and communion of which instances are incapable.

There are

generic Eide which run through whole areas of specific Eide which have relations
of mutual exclusion towards one another:

thus being an animal pervades all the

animal species, while these in their turn exclude one another.

The Eide there

fore necessarily form an immense hierarchical system, ranging from the most
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pervasively generic to the most exclusively specific, and dialectic must have
the task of placing each Eidos in this hierarchy, and relating it to the more
generic Eide above it, and the more specific Eide beneath it, as well as co
ordinating it with Eide which stand in neither of these relations to it.

Plato's

later thought concentrated strongly on such hierarchical divisions and collections,
but it is wrong to suppose that such an arrangement was not implicit in his
thought from the start, since the very notion of a Logos, is that of saying
what an Eidos covers and what it excludes, and so giving it a place in a hier
archy which can be indefinitely extended.

Socrates, we may say, was at all times

giving Eide tentative places in hierarchies, and Plato merely worked out the
rationale of this whole dialectical procedure.
It is plain finally that the Platonic ontology, which arose out of
Socraticism, was also from the start not only an ontology, but an axiology:

it

implied, though not always plainly stating it, that the prime Eide were pat
terns of excellence or goodness, and of an intelligibility which could not be
sharply separated from goodness, and that the bad and the imperfect could only
be thought of in so far as were excluded by, or declined from a standard of
perfection.

There are countless cases in the Platonic literature where Eide

of things bad or imperfect are considered, the impiety which is the opposite of
piety, the injustice which deviates from justice, the distorted forms of the
human soul or of human societies, the confused motions of the original chaos,
the absolute Non-being which is the object of Agnosia or Agnoia or what not:
we even learn that all knowledge is of opposites, and that knowing what an Eidos
or nature is^, involves knowing all the Eide or natures which deviate from it,
either absolutely or with varying degrees of remoteness.

This axiological

aspect of the Eide made it natural for Plato to make all the Eide specific
forms of the Good, and if, in the Phaedo, he sees it as the supreme task of
the physicist to determine how and why certain natural arrangements are good.
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he also opines in the same dialogue that the Eide are the true causes of anything
being as it is, the Eide being therefore given an essentially axiological sig
nificance.

In the Academy, we are told by the commentators, it was early held

that there cannot be Eide of everything, not, e.g. of things evil or negative
or changeable or accidental or partial, or hybrid or compound, or artificially
constructed, or due to choice or chance, but only of perfect substances and
their essential excellence.

The practice of Plato in seeming to give eidetic

status to perversions and distortions, and to structures as artificial as a
bed, is best seen as springing from an axiology deeper then the ordinary, one
that sees the absolutely good as being as essentially revealed in what negates
it, or deviates from it, as in what perfectly exemplifies it:

in excluding

what deviates from the well-formed and intelligible, the Absolutely Good in a
manner includes the former.

To know what is the good form of anything is to

know what is not its good form.

The placing of the Good at the apex of the

eidetic hierarchy likewise exemplies the union of ontology with axiology.

The

intelligible forms of things are the good forms of them, and we understand the
dark and confused through their departure from the luminous and perspicuous.
The Good, however, being the pervasive spirit of the whole eidetic hierarchy,
and all deviations from it, must necessarily transcend the well-formed, intel
ligible being of the Eide:

being the very Principle of Good Form, it cannot

be seen as merely a particular case, however exalted, of the well-formed.

The

mysticism of the Platonic approach to the Absolute Good, its transcendence of
being and definitional knowledge, a mysticism also present in Plato's magnificent
Second Epistle, is a profoundly rational mysticism:

it merely recognizes that

a Principle cannot, except by an impermissible of understandable extension, be
ranged alongside of its applications.
I do not, however, wish to remain further absorbed in Plato's first great
illumination, how ontological-axiological restatement of Socraticism.

I wish
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to pass to his second great illumination which never received full written
expression, though his writings, on my view, contain hints at it at countless
points.

This was his Pythagorean!zation of the Eide, his arithmetization of

them, and his reduction of all natures to numerical structures and relations,
which are not, however the numbers of our ordinary computations.

It will be

this second illumination with which I shall be concerned in the remainder of
my paper.
On my view there was nothing that speaks of lateness or decline in Plato1
second great illumination:

it must have occurred when Plato made his first

visit to Sicily and Southern Italy in 388-7 B.C.

He then arrived at the view

that the eidetic ontology into which he had transformed the ethical dialectic
of Socrates demanded a further transformation into a Pythagorean ontology, in
which Eide would be reduced to arithmetical patterns, and relations of Eide to
a derivation of all complex, many-dimensioned patterns and operations from
some absolutely simple and basic ones.

After a fashion, we may say that Plato

was led by the Italian Pythagoreans with whom he consorted to aspire to a
comprehensive philosophy of mathematics, of which the modern works of Frege
and Russell are in some respects fuller elaborations, though they do not
attempt to cover the whole territory of deductive science as Plato did.
Plato's arithmetization of the Eide was a natural development of his
belief in their absolute non-sensuousness.

The qualities of the senses vary

from moment to moment and person to person, and their relations cannot be
rendered perspicuous as those of numbers can.

The generation of all numbers

from a principle of primal Unity, successively imposing itself on a principle
of indefinite continuity, was at least an inspiring enterprise, and could per
haps be extended to cover the complexities of nature and human society as
one could not hope to derive the latter from the Hot and the Cold, the Moist
and the Dry, and other sensuous differences.

Aristotle was wholly unclear as
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to what Plato's identification of the Eide with numbers could possibly mean,
and from Aristotle the perplexity has spread to most later thinkers.

Does

Plato mean that an Eidos like that of a Horse is to be identified with a
Natural Number such as Eight?

This is obviously fantastic.

Or does it mean

that the essences of everything are ratios of numbers, as Empedocles taught of
the proportions of the elements which make up bone?
elements are they the ratios?

If this is so, of what

And how does Plato propose to educe Lines,

Figures and Solids, which come after the Natural Numbers, to Numbers?
they involve other non-numerical principles?
Decad?
Numbers.

Will

And how can anyone explain the

Obviously one cannot allot Numbers to everything if one has only ten
It seem obvious, however, that Plato could not have meant by his

universal arithmetization an identification of each Eidos with a Natural
Number or a ratio of such Numbers:

he can at best have meant that the essence

of everything, and of whatever was good in it, could be stated in a complex set
of numerical ratios and relationships, a view by no means absurd.

What is the

face of Mona Lisa, and its beauty, but a complex pattern of such ratios?

And

obviously the varying dimensions of space can be covered by extensions of the
Number system in new directions, as has in fact been done in the Complex Numbers
of modern mathematics.

Plato would seem to have thought of Lines as continuous

or flowing Numbers determined by two limiting points, surfaces as products of
at least two numbers fixed by at least three points, and solids as products of
three numbers fixed between at least four points.

If we know that the generation

of such dimensions requires more resources than Plato disposed of, he at least
made a beginning in the right direction.

And his restriction of all Numbers to

the Decadcannot have meant a restriction of all essences to the first ten Natural
Numbers, but rather a limitation of the types of numerical complexity that are
reflected in the dimensions of Space.

The Decad 10 is the sum of 1+2+3+4, and

hence is the Principle of all the Natural Numbers, all the one-dimensional Lines,
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all the two-dimensional surfaces and all the three-dimensional solids, and so
covers in a sense all Numbers.

These identifications of numerical dimension

could be extended to cover motions in time, and so could further be applied to
Souls which are in Platonism the ultimate sources of all motion, and are further
explicable in terms of the numerical patterns they inwardly understand and can
impose on the movements of bodies.
Aristotle tells us that Plato believed in two classes of Numbers, the
eidetic Numbers and the mathematical Numbers.

The eidetic Numbers were each

unique and single, whereas their mathematical correlates were numerous:

there

was only one eidetic Three, very Threeness itself, but there were infinitely
many mathematical threes.
three together make a six.

One can in mathematics say that a three added to a
Mathematical Numbers resemble Eide in being eternal

and non-sensuous, but they resemble instances in being many alike:

they are as

it were ideal instances, intermediate between Eide and sensible instances, and
for this reason are well illustrated by the latter, as Plato says in the Republic.
Mathematical Numbers can be added to one another, or subtracted from one another,
to yield other mathematical Numbers, but their eidetic originals are neither
addible or subtractible.

Fiveness does not consist of Threeness plus Twoness,

nor does Threeness consist of Fiveness minus Twoness.
fact wholly incomposite:
Eide.

Eidetic Numbers are in

they have the profound unity of each and all of the

Aristotle finds this all quite unintelligible.

How can there be a Three

itself which does not consist of three units or of a single unit plus a couple?
Plato would answer that eidetic Threeness is not a case of Threeness, but Three
ness itself, the Threeness in which all triads participate but whose unity they
cannot share.

Aristotle is then forced to the fantastic view that each eidetic

Number must consist of units peculiar to itself, but an eidetic Number can have
no constituents.

Plato further applies the notion of intermediate mathematicals

to Lines, Figures and Solids as well as Numbers.

There are many geometrical

(
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Straight Lines, Triangles and Cubes but only a single Eidos of the Line, the
Triangle and the Cube as such.

Here again we have ideal instantiations in a

position half way between Eide and sensuous instances.

And there are motions

in the dynamic problems of pure astronomers which are neither the motions of
actual bodies nor the eidetic types of motion which are ideally instantiated
in such problems.
The doctrine of the mathematical intermediaries is never clearly stated
in the Republic, but is hinted at again and again:

such intermediaries are

plainly needed to provide peculiar objects for dianoetic thought, though Plato
says it would be too complex to detail such objects, (See 516a, 525b, 526a, 534b).
Just as there are shadows and reflections which correspond to the solid meas
urable realities of reliable perception, so there have to be upper-world shadows
and reflections of eidetic patterns, and these can be none other than the Objects
of Mathematics.

And Mathematics leads on to the upper-world, dialectical study

of the Eide, precisely because it introduces us to well-formed, timeless images
of the Eide even if these happen to be many alike.

And Mathematics works on

hypotheses, since it takes for granted the being of the eidetic essences which
its multiple images exemplify, whereas Dialectic derives them all from a nonhypothetical first Principle of Absolute Unity or Goodness, which transcends all
the mathematical Eide, and all their ideal and sensuous instances, by being their
unquestioned, unhypothetical first principle.

The hypotheses of which Plato

speaks are, we may note, positings of entities or concepts, not assertions of
propositions.
Plato also took over from the Pythagoreans, we learn from Aristotle and
from other sources, a systematic 'generation' of all the eidetic Numbers, and
of the geometrical entities which come 'after' them, by the repeated interaction
of two Principles, both plainly Pythagorean.

One of these Principles was that

of Unity or the Good, which set definite bounds to quantitative variation in any
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direction, and was plainly the same as the Pythagorean Principle of the Peras
or Limit, while the other Principle was the 'bad' Principle of the Continuum,
which Plato called, not the Infinite or the Indefinite, as the Pythagoreans
did, but the Great and (the) Small, or the Indefinite Dyad.

Aristotle thought

that Plato meant to introduce two Principles in place of the one Pythagorean
Principle of the Infinite or Indefinite (Apeiron), but this is obviously not
the case.

The Great and Small is simply the Principle of Indefinite Quantity,

of what can be increased or decreased indefinitely, and which nowhere has fixed
boundaries.

The Greeks, like ourselves, were fascinated by the continuity of

space and time, and by their reflection in numerical fractions and ratios, and
by the sheer impossibility of setting final bounds to them in either direction.
The basic form of the Great and Small was the Many and Few, the raw material, as
it were, for the Natural Numbers.

It had a sub-species called the Long and

Short which provided the raw material for Lines, a sub-species called the Broad
and Narrow which, together with the Long and Short, provided the raw material
for Surfaces and Figures, and a sub-species called the Deep and Shallow which,
together with the two previous species, provided the raw material for Solid
Figures.

It seems possible, from what Plato says in the Republic, that Plato

recognized a further form of the Great and Small which made motion possible:
this was the Swift and the Slow which underlies the velocities in which astron
omers are interested.

Regular motions always reflect the action of the One

setting bounds to the irregularities due to the Great and Small.

All this gen

eration of the Eide by the imposition of Unity on the Great and Small was not
meant to take place successively in time, but to be essentially timeless.

Talk

of generation with its temporal suggestions is only for expository purposes,
though Aristotle is disposed to take it literally.
The percise nature of the generation is very obscure, and has had to be
filled in at many points by such interpretations as those of Robin, Stenzel and
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Ross.

In the case of the integers Plato did not generate them in their natural

order by the addition of a unity to its predecessor:
by multiplication and intercalation.

he preferred to proceed

An integral number is conceived as a

multiplicative power. Two doubles. Three triples, and so on, and hence all
factorizable Numbers can be obtained by multiplying Numbers by themselves or
by other Numbers, e.g. Nine is thrice Three etc.
rise to a problem:

The Prime Numbers then give

how are they to be generated?

Plato, on Robin's interpret

ation, seems to have imagined by a process of splitting the distance between
two factorizable Numbers, dividing it into two equal segments.
has a unique origin:

The Number Two

the obscure tendency to increase and decrease being so

limited that we have a precise doubling Unity.
multiplication yields all the powers of Two.

This being granted, self
Three then arise by an equal

division of the interval between Two and Four, and we now dispose of all the
products of Two and Three.

We can now generate Five by splitting the difference

between Four and Six and so on.

Multiplications and splitting of differences

thus yield all the Natural Numbers, and fractions can be generated in similar
ways.

I am not sure how much I understand of all these timeless processes:

obviously they prompt many questions.

Further generations are very obscure

and would seem to have involved some sort of timeless ideal fluxion.

Sextus

Empiricus, in this attack on the metaphysical mathematicians, among whom Plato
is plainly to be included, says that 'some say that Body arose from a single
point whose flux produced a Line, whose flux in its turn produced a Surface,
and, when this moved into depth, three-dimensional Body was generated.
bodies were thus constructed under the hegemony of Number.

Sol id

And from them lastly

sensible things arose, Earth and Water and Air and Fire and the cosmos as a
whole'.

Regular motion is a further product of this generative process, and a

final product is the Soul, the principle of living motion and thought.

Aristotle

says in De Anima 404b 'In the same way Plato in the Timaeus, makes the Soul out
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of the elements.
ciples.

For like is known by like, and things arise from their Prin

In the way in Plato's discourse On Philosophy it was laid down that

the Living Creature Itself came from the Idea of Unity Itself with the first
Length, Breadth and Depth, and other things in similar fashion.

And in yet an

other fashion they make Intuitive Mind (Nous) be the One, Knowledge the Dyad,
since it proceeds in a single line to one point, Opinion the number of the Sur
face, and Sensation the number of the Solid.

Things are judged by Intuition,

Knowledge, Opinion and Sensation, and these Numbers are the Eide of things.
It will be plain from these citations that Plato's identification of the Eide
with Numbers, and their generation by the intercourse of Unity with the Great
and Small, was an immensely complex theoretical construction, which Plato hoped
to see worked out by the labours of many insightful philosophers, and not at all
presently compassed by himself.

We have now to say some words in assessment of

this grandiose project which has been so little considered by the interpreters
of Plato’
s dialogues.

On our view Plato's mature thought in the Phaedo,

Republic. Symposium, Phaedrus, Parmenides etc. cannot be properly understood
without an understanding of the Unwritten Doctrines.

They became an aspiration

of Plato, not at a late, but at a quite early stage of his development.

All

Platonism and Neoplatonism and their many mediaeval offshoots show traces of
the doctrine that they were unable to interpret and develop satisfactorily.
The reduction of all natures of things, and all values and excellences,
to complexes of Numbers is of course somewhat strange to the modern philosopher,
who is inclined to stress the irreducibility of what is qualitative.

Science

may have reduced all colours, sounds, etc. to differences in wave-length and
frequency etc., but the philosopher is disposed to see something irreducible
and irremoveable in the passage from mere quantity to quality, and vice versa.
And all our aesthetic responses to the world and its contents seem to depend
in great part on differences that are qualitative, and not merely quantitative.
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The importance of measure and proportion as underlying beauty and moral goodness
was, however, deeply Hellenic:
express this.

both Aristotle's Ethics and Plato's Philebus

And after all, what makes an animal be a tiger or a musk-ox or

an elephant can be nothing but its characteristic shape and size and proportions,
all of which coni sist in ratios and measures.
plainly a matter of measure:

And the beauty of a face is

thicken the mouth or lengthen the nose or distance

the eyes a little, and it may be replaced by ugliness.

And the regular motions

of sun, moon, stars and planets, which to us are uninteresting, were to antiquity
the very type of the beautiful and orderly.

Such harmony is also in immortal

souls, and obviously notions of due proportion and equalization enter into the
virtues of Temperance, Courage and Justice, and into the practical Wisdom that
presides over them all.

The Platonic Republic was moreover run entirely on

Numbers, the times and frequencies of pairings for the various classes of the
citizens being decided by them, and a healthy, virtuous society would become
a corrupt, evil society if such Numbers were disregarded.

Plato had no experience

of the ugliness and wretchedness of a computer-run society, or one with only a
limited number of uniform products:

it was understandable that he should see

health and beauty and truth and virtue in men and societies dominated by the
mathematical equation.

Plato, however, like Aristotle, recognized the necessary

presence of the element of the inexact, approximate, indefinite, continuous,
ever

burgeoning and ever shriking element, in thought and reality, so that the

mathematization of all eidetic thought-patterns does not mean that exactness
and arithmetical simplicity will carry the day in all cases, and that all deviations
from this will be signs of depravity.

For Platonism believes that, not only all

instantia! existence, but also the eidetic paradigms that they copy or share in,
involve an element of the indefinite and inexact on which the limits of goodness
and precise measure are imposed.

Even in the realm of the Eide we have a proto

type of Space and Time, the media of instantiation:

Arithmetic arises when the
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Many and Few are bounded by Absolute Unity, Linear Geometry when the Long and
the Short are thus bounded, Plane Geometry when the Long and Short and Broad
and Narrow are thus bounded, and Solid Geometry when the limitation is extended
to the Deep and Shallow.

Time then becomes rhythmic and beautiful, and a moving

image of eternity, when the disorderly flux of primeval being becomes a matter
of fixed tracks and invariant velocity such as we see in the heavens.

All this

domination of the Great and Small by Absolute Unity is not only carried out in
the sensible Cosmos by the Demiugic Mind, but more perfectly and timelessly in
the realm of the Eide, for they too exhibit the indefinite dominated by the
Definite.

If all things are reflected upon, we can make sense of Plato's eidetic

Republic as an Eidos laid up in heaven, representing a perfect ordering of all
physical and psychic patterns in a single community, the most glorious triumph
of Unity over the Great and Small.

The Christian Kingdom of Heaven is an Eidos

having much the same coverage as the eidetic Republic of Plato, and we may well
hold that Christianity merely added a few complements and corrections to Plato's
idea of the perfect society.

Seen in these lights, Plato's mathematicization of

the Eide need not be nigglingly precise:

there are branches of mathematics that

deal with the inexact and probabilistic and topological, and arguably these are
as fundamental as those which are rigorously exact.
foresaw the existence of topology.

I do not suggest that Plato

I shall not continue my discourse further:

you can pursue the matter in my two books, and in those of Gaiser and Kramer.
I shall be content if I have led you to turn your backs on the view of Plato's
Unwritten Doctrines as a senile aberration of Plato, or as a gross misinterpret
ation of Aristotle, or as academic garbage which accumulated in the early
Academy.
Parmenides

I would also suggest that, not only the Republic, but also the
shows the continuous influence of the Unwritten Doctrines.

The

Absolutely Good is there identified with a Unity which is in one perspective
beyond all definite numerical and other determinations, while in another

(
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perspective permitting the derivation of all such determinations from itself,
and which is opposed by a principle of the Indefinite which, if we try to isolate
it, has just such an ever elusive shiftingness of content as we take the Great
and Small to have.

Hypothesis VII in particular is a wonderful picture of the

Great and Small, which is always ready to dissolve into a multitude of distinct
units, liable to indefinite further dissolution.

If one wants to see a sort of

existentialism in Plato, here one has it, but the serene profile of Absolute
Unity remains above undisturbed.

And in the world of the Eide the forces of

division and gross expansion are always perfectly under control, even if, in
the world of instances, everything always exceeds or falls short.
seen not to be a dualist.

And Plato is

For the expansion of the Eide into the realm of

instantiation is seen not to be an inexplicable fall, but a carrying further of
the domination of multiplicity and detail which is already present at the eidetic
level.

A Neoplatonist like Proel us worked the whole mystery out:

the One must

go forth from itself into endless specification and instantiation in order to
return to itself eternally and, so to be the One.

And these thoughts also

underlie the Dialectic of Hegel, for whom the Absolute Idea is the eternal
vision of itself in its Other. Hegel must have derived this conception from
the Parmenides of Plato, and so ultimately from Plato's Unwritten Doctrines.
The best of philosophy is therefore, to imitate an apophthegm of Whitehead's,
only a postscript to Plato.
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